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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important discovery limitations in Missouri practice, the
"work product" doctrine," also is one of the least understood. The doctrine
*The authors acknowledge the seminal Comment on this subject: Discovery-
Production of Attorney's Work Products, by The Honorable Ike Skelton, Jr., United
States Representative for the Fourth Congressional District of Missouri, 21 Mo. L.
REV. 279 (1956), and the suggestions on this work by Timothy W. Triplett, partner in
the firm of Blackwell Sanders Matheny Weary & Lombardi, Kansas City, Missouri,
author of Note, Confidential Communications Privilege of Husband and Wife:
Application under the Missouri Dissolution Statute, 43 Mo. L. REv. 235 (1978).
**Partner, Blackwell Sanders Matheny Weary & Lombardi, Kansas City, Mis-
souri. Mr. McMullen is a 1959 graduate of the University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law.
***Associate, Blackwell Sanders Matheny Weary & Lombardi, Kansas City,
Missouri. Mr. Foster is a 1982 graduate of the University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law.
I. The doctrine originally was based on Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(1947). Early Missouri cases followed Hickman. See infra note 17 and accompanying
1
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protects from discovery the trial preparations of parties and their representa-
tives and other materials prepared in anticipation of litigation.2 Frequently,
however, objections based on work product are raised for the wrong type of
materials or for incorrect reasons.3
A number of factors contribute to this continuing confusion. Some arise
from the dynamic nature of the doctrine. The scope of work product protection
has decreased, coinciding with the general trend in Missouri toward liberaliza-
tion of discovery.4 The present protection of work product has evolved from a
mixture of case law and supreme court rules.5
This article will examine the current status of work product under Mis-
souri law from a practical standpoint. First, we will summarize the current
rule and the development of the work product doctrine in Missouri. Major
limitations and exceptions will then be discussed. Next, we will look at the
basic prerequisites to attachment of work product protection, and will consider
when work product is discoverable. In conclusion, we will discuss strategies by
which lawyers can enhance the protection of their trial preparations.
II. THE DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW
A. Current Rule
Rule 56.01(b)(3) 6 establishes two levels of immunity, one qualified, the
text. The doctrine's current scope basically is established by Mo. R. Civ. P.
56.01(b)(3). The doctrine, however, may not be limited to the provisions of that rule.
See infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
2. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
3. Parties have often attempted to prevent discovery of relevant facts, wit-
nesses' names, and other discoverable material on work product grounds. These catego-
ries of information clearly are not immune from discovery on that basis. See infra notes
85-117 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 36-40, 92 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 14-40 and accompanying text.
6. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3) provides:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(4) of this Rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this Rule and pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or
for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
tial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning
the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. For purposes
of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (a) a written statement
[Vol. 50
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other absolute, that limit pretrial discovery. It does not limit materials that
may be subpoenaed for or admitted at trial.'
The rule limits discovery of documents and tangible things prepared by
parties and their representatives in anticipation of litigation.8 It is based upon
the principle that parties and their attorneys should be free to prepare for trial
without fear that their opponents will discover their preparations," thus en-
couraging diligent preparation by all parties. The ultimate objective of the rule
is enhancement of the adversarial system on the theory that protecting work
product will ensure that both parties will be in a position to effectively present
the issues at trial.
10
Two levels of work product are contemplated. Trial preparation materi-
als,11 such as witness statements, photographs, diagrams, and other investiga-
tive materials, are conditionally discoverable upon a showing of substantial
need and inability without hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent
through other means.12 "Opinion" work product, which includes the mental
impressions and legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
(often referred to as "the thoughts and opinions of counsel"), is absolutely
immune from discovery. 3
B. Development of Work Product Doctrine in Missouri
1. Development Before Rule 56.01(b)(3)
Prior to 1947, Missouri courts had recognized, at least impliedly, that
trial preparation materials should not be freely discoverable. 4 Formal protec-
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (b) a
stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription
thereof, which is a substantial recital of an oral statement by the person mak-
ing it and contemporaneously recorded.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). The rationale for the
work product doctrine is discussed at length in Note, The Work Product Doctrine, 68
CORNELL L. REv. 760, at 784-88 (1983).
10. See Note, supra note 9.
11. As used in this article, "trial preparation materials" include all work prod-
uct other than opinion work product, which is described infra at note 13 and accompa-
nying text.
12. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3); see also infra notes 182-96 and accompa-
nying text.
13. This absolute immunity may be subject to several narrowly drawn excep-
tions. See infra notes 173-81 and 197-209 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward, 351 Mo. 761, 767, 173
S.W.2d 920, 922 (1943) (en banc) (records of fire investigation subject to discovery
because they were not prepared in anticipation of lawsuit); cf. Curtis v. Indemnity Co.,
327 Mo. 350, 370, 37 S.W.2d 616, 625 (1931) (adjuster's letters held subject to sub-
poena at trial because they were part of an investigation in the ordinary course of the
party's business, "which investigation was not made in view of any existing or prospec-
1985]
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tion came only after the 1947 United States Supreme Court case of Hickman
v. Taylor.15 In Hickman, witness statements were protected from discovery as
trial preparation materials."6 Missouri courts quickly recognized Hickman as
persuasive authority.1 7
From the start, however, Missouri courts gave work product greater pro-
tection than envisioned in Hickman.' The doctrine was applied to materials
prepared by non-lawyers, 9 and all work product was held absolutely immune
from discovery, 20 even in cases of hardship. 2" A party seeking to compel dis-
covery of any material was required to establish three factors: 22 (1) rele-
vancy;23 (2) absence of "privilege;" and (3) "good cause."' 4 Under part two of




15. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
16. Id. at 509.
17. See, e.g., State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1072,
257 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Mo. 1950) (en banc) (now superceded in part by adoption of Mo.
R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3)); State ex rel. Miller's Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Caruthers, 360
Mo. 8, 12, 226 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
18. See Parrett v. Ford Motor Co., 47 F.R.D. 22, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (criticiz-
ing "unduly restrictive" Missouri work product doctrine and applying more liberal fed-
eral policy).
19. See Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1072, 257 S.W.2d 69, 75 (1953) (en banc) (work
product can be prepared by party's attorney or agent); Caruthers, 360 Mo. 8, 12, 226
S.W.2d 711, 713 (1950) (en banc) (applying work product protection to materials pre-
pared "by parties and their adjusters or investigators").
20. See Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1075, 257 S.W.2d 69, 75 (1953) (en bane) (pho-
tographs that probably were non-opinion trial preparation materials were absolutely
immune from discovery).
21. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Jensen, 362 S.W.2d 568,
570 (Mo. 1962) (en banc) (rejecting requesting party's argument that discovery of
work product should be permitted in cases of hardship); Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257
S.W.2d 69 (1953) (en banc) (photographs taken immediately after the accident which
very well could have uniquely preserved important evidence were absolutely privileged).
22. See, e.g., Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1070, 257 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (1953) (en
banc); State ex rel. St. Louis County Transit Co. v. Walsh, 327 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1959).
23. Discovery frequently was denied because the information sought would be
inadmissible at trial. See, e.g., Caruthers, 360 Mo. at 12, 226 S.W.2d at 713 (interrog-
atories improper because they called for hearsay evidence); State ex rel. Kroger Co. v.
Craig, 329 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Mo. App., Spr. 1959) (answers to interrogatories would
be inadmissible as hearsay). This restriction no longer applies. See Mo. R. Civ. P.
56.01(b)(1), which provides, in part: "It is not ground for objection that the informa-
tion sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasona-
bly calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
24. This test was established under the provisions of Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.030
(1949) (repealed). See, e.g., Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1070, 257 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Mo.
1953) (en banc).
25. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis County Transit Co. v. Walsh, 327 S.W.2d
713, 717 (Mo. App., St. L. 1959) (discoverability of photographs under the three-part
[Vol. 50
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Although the work product privilege is distinct from the attorney-client
privilege, 26 Missouri courts occasionally have confused them.27 For example,
the work product doctrine was said by one court to have "arisen" from the
attorney-client privilege.2 8 This reasoning contradicted Hickman v. Taylor,28
which established the doctrine because the attorney-client privilege did not ad-
equately address the problem.30 Even though later case law clarified the dis-
tinction, 31 all work product remained absolutely immune.
3
2
This absolute immunity led to some anomalous results. For example,
party statements were held not to be "work product,' 33 even though they often
were. Courts tempered the absolute rule by holding that investigators and
others engaged in trial preparation could be deposed for their factual knowl-
edge.34 Most decisions, however, perpetuated the application of the work prod-
uct doctrine as an absolute privilege,3 5 thereby foreclosing discovery of a wide
range of relevant material.
2. Rule 56.01(b)(3)
In 1975, the Missouri Supreme Court codified a work product rule,36
which is substantially the same as Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
test hinged upon whether work product "privilege" attached).
26. For a comparison of the work product and attorney-client privilege discov-
ery limitations, see infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d
22, 24 (Mo. 1961) (en banc) (basis of work product doctrine in attorney-client privi-
lege) (superceded in part by adoption of Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3)).
28. See id.
29. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
30. See id. at 508.
31. See State ex reL Mueller v. Dixon, 456 S.W.2d 594, 599 (Mo. App., K.C.
1970) (immunity from discovery of witnesses' statements rests upon work product
rule). But see Lindberg v. Safeway Stores, 525 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo. App., K.C.
1975) (protecting accident report as a privileged communication rather than work
product).
32. See, e.g., State ex rel. Premier Panels v. Swink, 400 S.W.2d 639, 644-45
(Mo. App., St. L. 1966) (inquiry regarding even the existence of photographs was
improper).
33. See, e.g., Combellick v. Rooks, 401 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Mo. 1966) (en banc)
(defendant entitled to discover a portion of his testimony in defense of a traffic charge
because it was not "work product"); State ex rel. Hudson v. Ginn, 374 S.W.2d 34, 39
(Mo. 1964) (en banc) (a party may discover any statement he has previously given to
an adverse party concerning the lawsuit or its subject matter because the statement is
not "work product").
34. See State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Elliott, 434 S.W.2d 532, 537-38
(Mo. 1968) (en banc) (investigators of a gas explosion required to divulge their factual
knowledge about the incident).
35. See, e.g., State ex rel. Premier Panels v. Swink, 400 S.W.2d 639, 644-45
(Mo. App., St. L. 1966).
36. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
1985]
5
McCullen and Foster: McCullen: Work Product in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Procedure.17 The rule fundamentally altered Missouri's approach to the work
product doctrine. It eliminated the absolute immunity of trial preparation
materials,38 and provided for discovery upon a showing of substantial need and
undue hardship.3 9 The rule applies to all materials prepared in anticipation of
litigation.4
0
Since 1975, the courts have clarified the distinction between work product
immunity and the attorney-client privilege in light of the new discoverability
test.4 1 Other cases have discussed protection of work product in other litiga-
tion 42 and the necessity of showing of need and hardship under the rule.
43
Many issues, however, remain either confused or unaddressed, including the
extent to which intangibles are protected,4 4 and the "anticipation of litigation"
requirement.'
5
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. Overview
Other limitations may preclude discovery of work product materials not-
withstanding a satisfactory showing of need and hardship.46 Conversely, cer-
tain rules may limit the extent to which parties can resist discovery on work
product grounds.' 7 This section will discuss such limitations on, and extensions
of, the scope of discovery.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The federal rule provides: "Upon request, a person
not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action
or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the
person may move for a court order." Id. There is no counterpart to this provision in
Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3). See supra note 6.
38. Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
39. Id.
40. Id; see also Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3). The previous work product rule
apparently did not apply to certain materials. See State ex rel St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.
v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Mo. 1961) (en banc) (photographs not "writ-
ings" within meaning of Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.01(b) (1959)).
41. See State ex rel. Spear v. Davis, 596 S.W.2d 499, 500-01 (Mo. App., E.D.
1980). But see State ex rel. St. Louis Little Rock Hosp. v. Gaertner, 682 S.W.2d 146,
149 (Mo. App., E.D. 1984) (stating that documents prepared at direction of employer
for obtaining attorney's advice or for use in litigation fall within attorney-client
privilege).
42. See State ex rel. J.E. Dunn Constr. Co. v. Sprinkle, 650 S.W.2d 707, 711
(Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
43. See Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). The
two-part showing for discovery of trial preparation materials under Rule 56.01(b)(3) is
referred to herein as the "need and hardship" test or showing.
44. Rule 56.01(b)(3) specifically regulates discovery of certain "documents and
tangible things ... " and does not purport to cover intangibles. See Mo. R. Civ. P.
56,01(b)(3); see also infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 146-71 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 48-84 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 85-117 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50
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B. Additional Limitations on the Scope of Discovery
1. Overview
Before an item can be obtained under the need and hardship test of Rule
56.01(b)(3), it must be "otherwise discoverable."4 8 The scope of discovery is
governed by Rule 56.01(b)(1), 49 which excludes from permissible discovery
items that are "privileged." 50 The effect of these provisions was demonstrated
in State ex rel. Cain v. Barker,5' in which the Missouri Supreme Court con-
cluded that because certain requested statements were "privileged," and there-
fore not within the scope of discovery under Rule 56.01, the court did not need
to evaluate whether the requesting party had satisfied the conditions of Rule
56.01(b)(3).52 Thus, if a requested item is protected by another privilege, the
Rule 56.01(b)(3) test is irrelevant. The privilege that most commonly might
attach to such a requested item of work product is the attorney-client privi-
lege; however, several other privileges should be considered in a discovery
situation. 3
Other discovery limitations also might defeat discovery of work product
notwithstanding a sufficient showing of need and hardship. Such limitations
might include objections on the .basis of burdensomeness and oppressiveness,
harassment, and bad faith.5 4
2. Important Discovery Privileges
a. Attorney-Client Privilege
(i) Basic Principles
By statute, an attorney is incompetent to testify "concerning any commu-
nication made to him by his client in that relation, or his advice thereon, with-
out the consent of such client. . . ."55 This is declaratory of the common
law.56 In State ex reL Great American Insurance Company v. Smith,57 the
Missouri Supreme Court held that the following test determines whether an
attorney-client communication is privileged: (1) whether, at the time of the
48. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
49. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(1).
50. Id.
51. 540 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
52. Id. at 57-58; see also State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574
S.W.2d 379, 388 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (Seiler, J., dissenting).
53. See infra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(c) (regarding protective orders).
55. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(3) (Supp. 1984).
56. See State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo.
1978) (en banc). It should be noted, however, that in the recent case of State v. Carter,
641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1982) (enobanc), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983), the Missouri
Supreme Court indicated the privilege was purely statutory in nature. Id. at 57.
57. 574 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
1985]
7
McCullen and Foster: McCullen: Work Product in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
communication, the relation of attorney and client existed; and (2) wlhether
the communication pertained to a matter for which the attorney had been
employed.5 8 The court broadly defined the scope of the privilege, holding that
when an attorney is retained with respect to a claim asserted by or against his
client, all communications from the attorney to the client with respect to the
matter are "essential elements of attorney-client consultation,"591 whether such
communications actually are "advice" to the client, or are factual reports or
other types of communication.60 Litigants should be mindful that attorney-
client communications are absolutely privileged6 and are not subject to the
substantial need and hardship test.62
(ii) Comparison with Work Product
Work product immunity is broader than the attorney-client privilege.
Work product does not have to be a communication in several important
ways. 63 It may be prepared by a wide range of persons, including a party's
employees and other non-attorney representatives. 64 Waiver of work product
protection may not be as automatic as waiver of the attorney-client privilege.6 5
In other ways, however, work product is more limited. Unlike work product,
attorney-client communications do not have to be prepared in anticipation of
litigation.6 Additionally, the attorney-client privilege clearly remains effective
through trial,67 while work product immunity normally should not extend
through trial at least when testimonial use is made of the materials.68
58. Id. at 386.
59. Id. at 385.
60. Id. at 384-85.
61. In camera review of attorney-client communications generally should not be
permitted in state court practice. See id. at 386-87. At least one federal court in Mis-
souri, however, has ordered production of attorney-client communications for in camera
review. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, Case No. 81-0945-A-CV-W-5 slip op. at 1-2
(W.D. Mo., June 25, 1982).
62. Of course, many attorney-client communications include the attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the lawsuit, all
of which are absolutely protected as opinion work product. See Mo. R. Civ. P.
56.01(b)(3). However, absent the attorney-client privilege, a court conceivably could
classify as ordinary work product a letter in which an attorney simply quotes, verbatim
or substantially verbatim, what a fact witness said during an interview.
63. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
64. See id.
65. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
66. See State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 386 (Mo.
1978) (en banc).
67. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(3) (Supp. 1984).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-40 (1975); Halford v.
Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400, 408-09 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977). See generally State ex rel.
State Highway Comm'n v. Kalivas, 484 S.W.2d 292, 294-95 (Mo. 1972). However, at








Missouri has established a privilege for certain communications between
insurers and insureds.69 This privilege is grounded in the attorney-client privi-
lege.70 An attorney, however, need not have been specifically retained with
respect to the subject matter of the communication."1
This privilege first was applied in State ex rel. Cain v. Barker_2 an auto-
mobile accident case. The plaintiff in Cain sought, under Rule 56.01 (b)(3), to
discover statements given by the defendant to his liability insurer after the
accident.7 3 The plaintiff argued that need and hardship existed under the work
product rule because the defendant had refused to give statements to the in-
surer of the plaintiff's decedent and the defendant had forgotten important
details by the time his deposition was taken.74
The Missouri Supreme Court held the defendant's statements were privi-
leged because an insurer-insured relationship existed between the defendant
and his insurer when he made the statements.75 The court indicated that such
communications would be privileged under the following conditions: (1) the
statement must be to a liability insurer for the purpose of defending any law-
suit against the insured arising out of a potentially liability-creating event; (2)
the potential liability must be covered under the insurance policy; and (3) the
insurer must be obligated under the policy to provide the insured with a
defense.76
As Chief Justice Seiler noted in his dissent, this privilege insulates a large
category of material from discovery under Rule 56.01(b)(3).7 7 It does not,
however, completely nullify conditional work product discovery. Statements of
witnesses to an insurer are not covered,78 and the privilege is restricted to com-
munications from a prospective defendant to his liability insurer with respect
to a potentially liability-creating event.7 9 Thus, the impact on discovery prac-
tice is confined to a narrow category.
c. Other Privileges
Other privileges that should be considered in appropriate situations in-
69. See State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
70. Id. at 53-54.
71. Id.
72. 540 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
73. Id. at 51-52.
74. Id. at 52.
75. Id. at 53.
76. Id. at 53-57.
77. Id. at 58-62 (Seiler, C.J., dissenting).
78. The privilege only attaches to statements by the insured. Id. at 53-57.
79. See id. The privilege does not extend to other communications between in-
sureds and insurers. See, e.g., State ex reL J.E. Dunn Constr. Co. v. Sprinkle, 650
S.W.2d 707, 709-10 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
1985]
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clude the husband-wife privilege,80 the physician-patient privilege, 8' the priest-
penitent privilege, 82 and the accountant-client privilege.8 3 These privileges are
less important in the context of this discussion, however, because the matters
they protect are less likely to be prepared in anticipation of litigation than
attorney-client and insurer-insured communications.84
C. Work Product Exceptions that Expand Scope of Discovery
1. General
A number of items commonly sought in discovery are not protected as
work product, including knowledge of relevant facts8" and the identity of per-
sons with knowledge relating to the matter in dispute.88 These unprotected
items cannot be converted into "work product" by being recited in protected
memoranda of a party or its representatives.8 7 Moreover, transmission of such
discoverable items by privileged communication will not insulate them from
discovery.88 For example, otherwise discoverable material gathered by an at-
torney and transmitted to his client is not thereby converted into work prod-
uct.89 Even if only the attorney is aware of these discoverable matters, they
must be revealed.9 0
80. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 491.020, 546.260 (1978); see also Note, Confiden-
tial Communications Privilege of Husband and Wife: Application under the Missouri
Dissolution Statute, 43 Mo. L. REV. 235 (1978).
81. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(5) (Supp. 1984). The privilege is waived
once a plaintiff files suit for personal injuries, thereby putting his condition in issue. See
State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
82. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(4) (Supp. 1984).
83. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 326.151 (1978); see also Commerical Union Ins. Co.
v. Talisman, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 490, 491 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
84. At least with respect to the spousal and the priest-penitent privileges, the
matters covered thereby also are less likely to be in writing.
85. See, e.g., State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Elliott, 434 S.W.2d 532,
537 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (investigators subject to deposition on factual knowledge);
State ex rel. Mueller v. Dixon, 456 S.W.2d 594, 599-600 (Mo. App., K.C. 1970) (fac-
tual information developed during party's investigation subject to discovery).
86. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hudson v. Ginn, 374 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Mo. 1964) (en
banc); State ex rel. Uregas Serv. Co. v. Adams, 364 Mo. 389, -, 262 S.W.2d 9, 11
(1953) (en bane); Garrison v. Garrison, 640 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982).
87. See State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50, 61 (Mo. 1976) (en banc)
(dicta); cf. State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Mo. 1978)
(en banc) (attorney-client privilege does not extend to discoverable matters recited in
communications between attorney and client).
88. Cf. State ex rel Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith 574 S.W.2d 379, 385; Curtis
v. Indemnity Co., 327 Mo. 350, 369-70, 37 S.W.2d 616, 625-26 (1931) (transmission
of non-privileged report to attorney would not cause privilege to attach).
89. Cf. State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Mo.
1978) (en banc).
90. See State ex rel. Hofv. Cloyd, 394 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1965) (en banc);
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2. Specific Discoverable Matters
a. Knowledge of Facts
One of the basic underpinnings of the modern pretrial discovery process is
the right to discover all relevant facts. 1 The Missouri Supreme Court on sev-
eral occasions has reiterated its predisposition toward open discovery.9 2 It is
not surprising, therefore, that Missouri litigants have had little success in
utilizing the work product doctrine as a means for insulating factual knowl-
edge from discovery.
State ex rel. Hof v. Cloyd 9 3 demonstrates the Missouri Supreme Court's
unwillingness to limit discovery of facts through the work product doctrine. In
Cloyd, the court stated that factual information is not protected simply be-
cause it is developed during the party's investigation, whether such knowledge
is possessed by the party or only by his attorney.94
This principle formed the basis of the court's decision in State ex rel.
Missouri Public Service Co. v. Elliott.95 The relator sought to depose insur-
ance company investigators who examined the scene of an explosion. The in-
surance company's attorney objected to any substantive questioning, arguing
that all of the investigators' knowledge and actions were work product.96 Re-
jecting the insurance company's arguments, the Missouri Supreme Court held
that the investigators could be deposed regarding what they saw, and whether
they removed or disturbed anything.97 The court also held that the investiga-
tors could be deposed regarding their actions at the scene of the explosion "to
the extent that any ordinary individual would, so long as that testimony does
not necessarily involve their conclusions."9 8 Thus, the court, in allowing dis-
covery, still protected from disclosure the "thoughts and opinions of counsel."
b. Identity of Persons with Knowledge
The Missouri Supreme Court early established that objections based on
work product could not defeat discovery of the identity of persons with factual
91. See State ex reL Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Elliott, 434 S.W.2d 532, 537
(Mo. 1968) (en banc); State ex rel. Hof v. Cloyd, 394 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1965)
(en banc).
92. This predisposition was evident both before and after the work product doc-
trine was established. See, e.g., State ex reL Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Elliott, 434
S.W.2d 532, 538 (Mo. 1968) (en banc); State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward, 351
Mo. 761, 763, 173 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo. 1943) (en bane).
93. 394 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1965) (en banc).
94. Id. at 411.
95. 434 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
96. Id. at 535.
97. Id. at 537.
98. Id; see also State ex reL Spear v. Davis, 596 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Mo. App.,
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knowledge relating to a lawsuit. In State ex reL Uregas Service Co. v. Ad-
ams,99 the court held that the relator could not withhold names of its agents
who examined the scene of a gas explosion because the agents were witnesses
to facts relating to the lawsuit.100 The Uregas holding has been codified by
court rule 01 and reinforced by subsequent decisions, both before and after the
effective date of Rule 56.01(b)(3).' 0 2
c. Party Statements
Parties have been allowed to obtain their own statements since 1959.103
The current party statements discovery provision is in Rule 56.01(b)(3).'"
Missouri courts have expansively interpreted the party statements discov-
ery rule. In Combellick v. Rooks, 05 the plaintiff made a transcript of the
defendant's testimony at a traffic court hearing concerning a traffic offense
with which the defendant was charged. During discovery in the civil case, the
plaintiff denied having possession of any statement by the defendant.10 6 At
trial, the plaintiff impeached the defendant's testimony with the traffic court
transcript.10 7 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed a judgment for the plain-
tiff on the ground that the defendant had been unfairly prejudiced by the
plaintiff's use of the traffic court transcript. 108 Rejecting the plaintiff's argu-
ment that she was obligated only to produce copies of any statements by the
defendant to the plaintiff, the court stated that the rule applied to all state-
ments of the requesting party concerning the lawsuit or its subject matter." 9
Under this interpretation, the transcript of the defendant's police court testi-
mony was held discoverable under the rule." 0
The Combellick case did not address the discoverability of a party's unre-
corded statement. Rule 56.01(b)(3) provides that a discoverable party "state-
ment" is either a written statement adopted or approved by the party by signa-
ture or otherwise, or a contemporaneous recording of a party's statement,
99. 262 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1953) (en banc).
100. Id. at 11; see also State ex rel. Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Caruthers,
360 Mo. 8, 11, 226 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
101. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(1).
102. See, e.g., State ex reL Hudson v. Ginn, 374 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Mo. 1964) (en
banc); State ex reL Pete Rhodes Supply Co. v. Crain, 373 S.W.2d 38, 44 (Mo. 1963)
(en banc); Garrison v. Garrison, 640 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Mo. App., E.D. 1982); Mis-
souri State Park Bd. v. McDaniel, 473 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Mo. App., Spr. 1971); and
State ex rel. Williams v. Vardeman, 422 S.W.2d 400, 407 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967).
103. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01 and 47.01(b) (1959); see also State ex reL Hud-
son v. Ginn, 374 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Mo. 1964) (en bane).
104. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
105. 401 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
106. Id. at 463.
107. Id.
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including transcriptions, which is a "substantially verbatim recital" of the re-
questing party's oral statement.111 This definition arguably excludes an unre-
corded statement.
d. Basis for Claim
A party may not conceal the factual basis for its claims on work product
grounds. Rule 55.27(d) 1 2 provides for a motion for a more definite statement
of any matter that is not plead with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
allow the opposing party properly to prepare responsive pleadings or to prepare
for trial if no responsive pleading is required."3
Discovery requests requiring identification of the facts upon which a
claim is based probably are not objectionable. However, such requests for a
party's contentions may require disclosure of an attorney's legal theories if
they are inartfully drafted, and thus be objectionable." x4
e. Existence of Documents
Under pre-Rule 56.01(b)(3) case law, the existence of work product
materials often was protected." 5 This rule should no longer be followed. Rule
56.01 allows parties to discover the existence of documents related to the law-
suit." This is a common discovery tactic. The possible non-discoverability of a
document on work product grounds should not be sufficient grounds for con-
cealing the identity of such document."
7
I1. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
112. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.27(d).
113. Id.
114. See generally J. MOORE, 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.56[3], at 26-
139 ("to aid trial preparation, discovery is allowed as to the factual basis of the com-
plaint, and as to the contentions of the defense"). Missouri lawyers must be careful,
however, to avoid making such requests in too broad a matter, or in a manner that
requires the interrogated party to draw legal conclusions. See, e.g. State ex rel. Gamble
Constr. Co. v. Carrol, 408 S.W.2d 34, 36-38 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
115. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d
22, 24-25 (Mo. 1961) (en banc); State ex rel. Uregas Serv. Co. v. Adams, 364 Mo.
389, 393-94, 262 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Mo. 1953) (en bane); State ex rel. Premier Panels v.
Swink, 400 S.W.2d 639, 644-45 (Mo. App., St. L. 1966).
116. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(1).
117. In addition to Rule 56.01(b)(1), discovery of the existence of documents
that might be work product is supported by the conditional discovery provisions of Rule
56.01(b)(3). Even if a document is work product, the opposing party might be able to
compel its production; and therefore, such party should be able to discover the docu-
ment's existence. See generally J. MOORE, 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.64[2],
at 26-353 to 26-354.
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IV. DETERMINING WORK PRODUCT STATUS
A. Overview
After consideration of non-work product discovery limitations and excep-
tions, 118 it remains to be determined whether the material sought actually is
work product, the type of work product,119 and whether the requesting party
can establish need or hardship, 20 or demonstrate a waiver of the protection.1 21
This section will focus on the basic elements that must be established to invoke
work product protection: (a) what types of matter may be protected, and what
may not; (b) persons who can create work product; and (c) the anticipation of
litigation requirement.
B. Types of Work Product
1. Trial Preparation Materials
This category includes anything tangible prepared by a party or its repre-
sentatives in anticipation of litigation.1 22 Such materials are work product if
they are: (1) "otherwise discoverable" under Rule 56.01(b)(1); (2) "prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial;" and (3) prepared by a party or its
representative. 23 Tangible items that have been or should be accorded work
product status include accident reports,1 24 photographs, 25 surveillance films or
photographs 1 26 witness statements, 127 diagrams, 128 maps,"2" and drawings.130
The rule does not specifically address intangibles.1 31 Clearly, a party must
118. See supra notes 46-117 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 182-96 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
122. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
123. See id.
124. Cf. Lindberg v. Safeway Stores, 525 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo. App., K.C.
1975) (accident report prepared in anticipation of litigation protected under the attor-
ney-client privilege).
125. See Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); State ex
rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 257 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Mo. 1953) (en banc). Under
Flynn, photographs taken in anticipation of litigation were absolutely privileged from
discovery. To that extent, Porter overruled Flynn, establishing instead that photographs
are discoverable upon a sufficient showing of need and hardship.
126. See State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 25
(Mo. 1961) (en banc).
127. See State ex rel. Mueller v. Dixon, 456 S.W.2d 594, 599 (Mo. App., K.C.
1970).
128. See Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1082, 257 S.W.2d 69, 75 (Mo. 1953) (en banc)
(dicta).
129. See id. (dicta).
130. See id. (dicta).
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disclose recollections of discoverable facts and the identity of witnesses.132
However, what is the status of recollections of witness statements, instructions
to investigators, and other undocumented preparations?
It could be argued that discovery of a party's recollections relating to its
investigation would invade an area inextricably intertwined with the party's
"mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories,"'1 33 and thus un-
avoidably would infringe upon opinion work product. Alternatively, a party
might contend that discovery of such recollections is not specifically covered
by Rule 56.01(b)(3), and, instead, is prohibited by the pre-Rule 56.01(b)(3)
work product "privilege." In Porter v. Gottschall,'" the court stated that Rule
56.01(b)(3) had "abrogated" the work product privilege as to documents and
tangible things.135 One could argue that, as to intangible work product, the
privilege continues. 36
Intangible work product should be protected because the recollections of
parties and their representatives of witnesses' statements and other factual as-
pects of parties' investigations inevitably are colored by their theories and im-
pressions. Protecting this category will not infringe on discovery of facts; it
simply will prevent discovery of parties' impressions of those facts.
2. Opinion Work Product (Tangible and Intangible)
If a court requires production of trial preparation materials, it must "pro-
tect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or re-
gal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.' 37 Missouri courts have accorded such opinion work product,
whether tangible or intangible, absolute immunity from discovery.1 38
In State ex rel. Missouri Public Service Co. v. Elliott,139 the Missouri
Supreme Court allowed the relator to depose investigators who had inspected
the scene of an explosion, but specifically noted that the deposing party could
not require testimony that necessarily would involve the investigators' conclu-
132. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
133. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
134. 615 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
135. Id. at 65.
136. Recollections of trial preparations, such as instructions given to investiga-
tors and other intangibles, more logically could be included within the "privileged"
work product category. Cf. State ex rel Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Caruthers, 360
Mo. 8, 12, 226 S.W.2d 711, 713 (1950) (en banc) (protecting instructions to agents
and subjective purposes in trial preparations because discovery request sought
"hearsay").
137. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
138. See, e.g., State ex reL Spear v. Davis, 596 S.W.2d 499, 500-01 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1980); Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400, 409 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977); Miller v.
ler, 556 S.W.2d 492, 492-93 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977).
139. 434 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
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sions. 140 Cases decided after the adoption of Rule 56.01(b)(3) continue the
absolute protection of intangible opinion work product. 41 For example, courts
have held absolutely immune the identity of witnesses whom a party intends to
call at trial.142 This clearly is an example of intangible opinion work product.
C. Making the Determination
1. Persons Who Can Create Work Product
An item is "work product" if it was created by or on behalf of a party in
anticipation of litigation. The first part of this test is easy to satisfy because
work product protection extends to material prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion by a party and its representatives, including attorneys, consultants, sure-
ties, indemnitors, insurers, and agents. 143 The inclusion of parties' agents
makes this listing practically all-encompassing.
The representative must be working for the party at the time he creates
work product materials. For example, in State ex rel. Missouri Public Service
Co. v. Elliott,14 4 the supreme court noted that an attorney cannot assert a
work product claim unless he is acting on behalf of a client."4 This principle
should apply to any party representative. Work product protection should at-
tach only to materials prepared for a party.
2. Anticipation of Litigation Requirement
The anticipation of litigation requirement has caused more difficulty. As a
practical matter, if a colorable showing can be made that a requested item was
prepared in anticipation of litigation, Missouri courts tend to find that the
item is work product.146 If there is a dispute regarding whether a requested
item was prepared in anticipation of litigation, the trial court should resolve
the issue as a question of fact. -7 While some pre-Rule 56.01(b)(3) cases pro-
140. Id. at 537.
141. See supra cases cited in note 138.
142. See, e.g., Garrison v. Garrison, 640 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Mo. App., E.D.
1982); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Pfitzinger, 569 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1978).
143. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
144. 434 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
145. Id. at 535.
146. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d
22, 24-25 (Mo. 1961) (en banc); State ex rel. Uregas Serv. Co. v. Adams, 364 Mo.
389, 394, 262 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1953) (en banc); State ex reL Premier Panels v. Swink,
400 S.W.2d 639, 644-45 (Mo. App., St. L. 1966); see also State ex reL. Spear v. Davis,
596 S.W.2d 499, 500-01 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (court apparently assumed that any
impressions formed by casualty insurer's agent were in anticipation of litigation).
147. Trial courts were given leeway in reviewing parties' assertions of work prod-
uct protection prior to the adoption of Rule 56.01(b)(3). See, e.g., State ex reL St.
Louis County Transit Co. v. Walsh, 327 S.W.2d 713, 717-18 (Mo. App., St. L. 1959)
(appellate court refused to disturb the trial court's ruling that photographs were not
[Vol. 50
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tected the identity of work product materials, parties now are probably re-
quired to identify documents.148
Several factors have influenced Missouri courts' application of the "antic-
ipation of litigation" requirement.149 Unfortunately, one factor has been un-
duly emphasized. Missouri courts often have accepted the fallacy that materi-
als created in the ordinary course of business necessarily are not work product
prepared "in anticipation of litigation.' 5 0 Instead of being dispositive, this
should be but one factor for consideration along with the other factors dis-
cussed below.
The point at which a requested item was created can be an important
factor relating to the anticipation of litigation issue.' 5' However, timing is not
dispositive in all cases. In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Jen-
sen, '52 the Missouri Supreme Court held that appraisal reports prepared for
the State Highway Commission were protected work product. The court held
work product) (Motion to transfer den. noted at 327 S.W.2d 713). This discretion
should still remain part of post-Rule 56.01(b)(3) work product analysis by appellate
courts. Walsh made it clear that parties asserting work product protection for docu-
ments under some circumstances would have to establish a basis for their claims. Id. at
717. Parties did not, however, have to make a showing in all cases. See, e.g., State ex
rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo. 1961) (en banc)
(court presumed that any photographs requested could only have been taken in antici-
pation of litigation).
148. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of
factors relating to the federal anticipation of litigation requirement, see Note, Work
Product Discovery: A Multifactor Approach to the Anticipation of Litigation Require-
ment in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), 66 IOWA L. REV. 1277 (1981).
150. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50, 58 n.1 (Mo. 1976)
(en banc) ("Ordinarily, facts, information and records obtained or made in the ordi-
nary and usual course of business are discoverable.") (Seiler, C.J., dissenting); State ex
rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo. 1961) (en banc)
(photographs were work product because they were not created in the ordinary course
of business and could not have been created for any reason other than litigation); State
ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1073-74, 257 S.W.2d 69, 74-75
(1953) (en banc) (work product issue hinged upon whether requested photographs were
created in the ordinary cause of business); State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward,
351 Mo. 761, 766, 173 S.W.2d 920, 922 (1943) (en banc) (court implicitly accepted
theory that fire investigation reports created in ordinary course of business could not be
protected as trial preparation'materials); cf. Curtis v. Indemnity Co. of Am., 327 Mo.
350, 369-70, 37 S.W.2d 616, 625 (1931) (report subject to subpoena at trial because it
was created in the ordinary course of business). Missouri courts have not been alone in
misconstruing the importance of this factor. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572
F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977) (no work product immunity for materials "prepared in
the regular course of business rather than for purposes of the litigation") (emphasis
added) (quoting 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2024, at 198-99 (1970)).
151. See, e.g., Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1073-74, 257 S.W.2d 69, 74-75 (1953) (en
banc) (photographs taken after accident were work product); State ex rel. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Mo. 1961) (en banc) (same).
152. 362 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1962) (en banc).
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that the Highway Commission was justified in anticipating litigation even
though the reports were prepared before the parties' rights to seek relief in the
circuit court had matured.1 53
A closer question is presented in situations involving transactions that the
parties realize may result in litigation. An insurance company's investigation
regarding its liability under a policy should be protected even though such
research is conducted prior to the company's denial of coverage.154 However,
research regarding the design of a new product probably cannot be character-
ized as being in anticipation of litigation notwithstanding manufacturers'
awareness that design defects may lead to lawsuits.155
The technical accrual of a cause of action is a guideline for courts and
parties. It should not be applied blindly, however. Under some circumstances,
courts should recognize that parties may reasonably anticipate specific law-
suits prior to accrual of the cause of action.
Another factor is the position and function of the individual creating or
requesting the creation of a requested item.156 The item may be work product
even if it was not prepared by or at the request or direction of an attorney or
other individual with discretionary decision-making power. 157 However, docu-
ments and other items created by or at the direction of individuals with wide
discretionary authority or legal or quasi-legal duties are more likely to be clas-
sified as work product than documents created by individuals with little discre-
tionary authority or whose job functions would not normally relate to legal
matters.158 Documents created by parties or their employees are less likely to
be classified as work product than documents created by outside consultants,
investigators, or attorneys. 5 9 Courts will focus on whether the person who cre-
ated the item was in a position in which he logically would have duties relating
to potential litigation. Persons whose duties relate to the party's ordinary busi-
ness, primarily employees, obviously are less likely to be involved in prepara-
tions for trial.1 60
153. Id. at 570.
154. In Curtis, 327 Mo. at 369-70, 37 S.W.2d at 625, an insurer's investigation
of its potential liability for fire loss under policy was held not privileged. Curtis, a pre-
Hickman case, involved admissibility at trial, not discoverability.
155. See generally, 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 55 (1983). Cf.
Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977) (work product im-
munity does not attach merely because of a "remote prospect" of litigation).
156. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d
22, 24-25 (Mo. 1961) (en banc) (comment distinguishing State ex rel. St. Louis
County Transit Co. v. Walsh, 327 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo. App., St. L. 1959), on
grounds that "the driver [in Walsh] was one who would ordinarily have nothing to do
with investigations or the defense of claims").
157. See, e.g., Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1073, 257 S.W.2d 69, 75 (1953) (en bane).
158. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d
22, 24 (Mo. 1961) (en bane).
159. See, e.g., id.
160. See, e.g., id.
[Vol. 50
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/3
WORK PRODUCT
A third important factor is the time lapse between a liability-creating
event and creation of a requested item.1 61 Again, this factor is not dispositive.
Missouri courts have readily extended work product protection to documents
created shortly after a liability-creating event.162 A long time lapse between
creation of the requested item and filing of the lawsuit will favor the request-
ing party, while a short time lapse will favor the party opposing discovery.16 3
The most important factor affecting the anticipation of litigation issue is
whether the requested item was created in the ordinary course of business.
Based upon prior Missouri case law, it appears that work product protection
probably will be denied if the court concludes that the requested material was
prepared in the party's ordinary course of business.1 ' For instance, in State ex
rel. Cain v. Barker,165 Chief Justice Seiler observed that "ordinarily, facts,
information and records obtained or made in the ordinary and usual course of
business are discoverable. ' 6
Preparation of a document or gathering of information in the ordinary
course of business should not automatically render the document or informa-
tion discoverable, and, at least sometimes, it does not.1 67 Confusion about this
issue will continue until Missouri courts clearly rule that preparation in the
ordinary course of business is not dispositive of the anticipation of litigation
issue.168
This issue is not purely academic. Insurance companies investigate
161. See, e.g., State ex rel. Iron Fireman Corp. v. Ward, 351 Mo. 761, 766, 173
S.W.2d 920, 922 (1943) (en banc) (document created shortly after event held discover-
able); State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Coi v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo.
1961) (en banc) (dicta indicating photographs taken immediately after accident are
less likely to be work product); cf. Curtis, 327 Mo. 350, 369, 37 S.W.2d 616, 625
(1931) (reports made shortly after accident were not "privileged" and were subject to
subpoena).
162. See, e.g., Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Mo. 1981) (en banc)
(photographs taken shortly after accident). In Porter, although photographs taken
shortly after an accident were work product, they were held discoverable under the
need and hardship test of Rule 56.01(b)(3). Id. at 65-66.
163. See, e.g., Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1073, 257 S.W.2d 69, 74 (1953) (en banc)
(photographs taken nine days before suit filed were work product); cf. Curtis, 327 Mo.
350, 369, 37 S.W.2d 616, 625-26 (1931) (reports written 22 months before lawsuit
filed were subject to subpoena for trial).
164. See supra cases cited in note 150.
165. 540 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
166. Id. at 58 n.1.
167. For example, in a post-Rule 56.01(b) (3) case, a casualty insurer's agent was
not required to testify about his mental impressions formed during an investigation of
the insured's loss, even though such investigation clearly was in the casualty insurer's
ordinary course of business of settling claims. State ex rel. Spear v. Davis, 596 S.W.2d
499, 500-01 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
168. Iowa recently clarified this point. See Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197,
200-01 (Iowa 1983). Ashmead is analyzed in depth in Note, A Routine Investigation
of an Accident by a Liability Insurer is Conducted in Anticipation of Litigation within
the Meaning of Iowa R. Civ. P. 122(c), 33 DRAKE L. REv. 727 (1984).
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thousands of incidents every year. At least one Missouri case has indicated
that such investigations, being in the ordinary course of insurance companies'
business, are not shielded from discovery.1 69 Concededly, investigations are a
normal adjunct to the insurance business, but they almost always are in re-
sponse to a specific event out of which litigation might arise. It is mistaken to
say that because such investigations are part of insurance companies' everyday
business, they are not conducted "in anticipation of litigation." When insurers
become directly involved in litigation, they should be able to assert work prod-
uct protection for investigative materials concerning an accident or other lia-
bility creating event.170
Another area in which the ordinary course of business fallacy holds the
potential for great mischief involves records prepared by parties pursuant to
requirements of law. For example, many manufacturers are required by fed-
eral regulations to prepare and maintain investigative reports of complaints
involving serious injuries and deaths related to their products.171 Such reports
clearly are prepared with full awareness that litigation may arise out of the
reported event. Holding such reports discoverable will impair the effectiveness
of the investigation.
Creation of materials in the ordinary course of a party's business should
not foreclose work product protection. Some parties' ordinary business includes
investigation of liability-creating events and preparation for trial. Missouri
courts should abandon their lockstep adherence to the idea that materials pre-
pared in the ordinary course of business cannot be work product.
V. DISCOVERY OF WORK PRODUCT
A. Opinion Work Product
Opinion work product is protected absolutely from discovery under Mis-
souri law,"7 subject to several possible exceptions: where the protection is
waived,17 3 where the work product relates directly to an issue in the case,' 74 or
where fraud is involved.17 5
169. See, e.g., Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69, 75 (1953) (en banc)
(dicta).
170. Where an insurance investigation is made on behalf of an insured and the
insurer is not directly involved, the ordinary course of business factor should not be
relevant. The focus should be whether the requested material was created in the ordi-
nary course of a party's business. But see State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d 50,
58 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
171. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 803 (1985) (requiring reports from medical device
manufacturers).
172. State ex rel. Spear v. Davis, 596 S.W.2d 499, 500-01 (Mo. App., E.D.
1980).
173. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
175. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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In Curtis v. Indemnity Co.,"61 a pre-Hickman case, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that letters from an adjuster to the insurance company evaluating
a fire loss, which today might have been considered opinion work product,
17
were subject to subpoena for use at trial because they related to the insurance
company's basis for denying coverage. 17 8 Whether Curtis would control in
such a case today is debatable, however, at least where the attorney-client
privilege is available.'7 9 Another "at issue" exception might arise from cases of
malicious prosecution. 8 '
Missouri courts may choose to follow a federal court doctrine which rec-
ognizes a "fraud/conspiracy" exception to the opinion work product rule. The
doctrine also applies to attorney-client communications. 18' Where an attorney
conspires or participates with his client in the perpetration of a fraud or crime,
courts are not likely to allow such activities to be sheltered under the work
product doctrine.
B. Trial Preparation Materials
Rule 56.01(b)(3) requires the party seeking discovery to establish: (1)
substantial need for the materials in preparing its case; and (2) inability to
obtain the substantial equivalent thereof by other means without undue hard-
ship. 8 2 Missouri case law offers little guidance with respect to practical appli-
cation of this requirement. Substantial need may be found when the requested
material constitutes evidence that materially could influence the litigation. In
Porter v. Gottschall,183 the Missouri Supreme Court found substantial need
where accident scene photographs that were requested in discovery were the
only reliable evidence "which could have shown the position of the vehicles
176. 327 Mo. 350, 37 S.W.2d 616 (1931).
177. The letters consisted of reports by the insurance investigator concerning his
evaluation of the loss and whether it was covered by the policy. Id. at 625-26. However,
among other factors cited by the court in holding the letters were not privileged was an
almost two-year time lapse between the letters and the lawsuit. Thus, the letters might
not have been considered work product. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying
text.
178. Curtis, 327 Mo. at __ , 37 S.W.2d at 626.
179. This is illustrated by the holding in State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1978) (en banc). Smith arose out of the relator's denial
of coverage for the insured's fire loss. Even though the insured claimed vexatious re-
fusal to settle, the court held that letters from an attorney to the relator relating to the
coverage issue were absolutely protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 384-85.
180. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 831-33.
181. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 811-16 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See
generally J. MOORE, 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.64[4], at 26-439 to 26-446;
Note, supra note 9, at 833-37.
182. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3). Parties cannot circumvent this requirement by
using discovery devices other than interrogatories or document production requests.
See, e.g., State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Keet, 601 S.W.2d 669, 672
(Mo. App., S.D. 1980).
183. 615 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
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after the accident, the debris on the road, and possibly skid marks. ' 184 Sub-
stantial need also has been found where the requesting party has established a
substantial likelihood that the materials will impeach a witness's testimony. 185
Courts determine inability to obtain a substantial equivalent without un-
due hardship based upon what alternative evidence is realistically available to
the requesting party. 88 In Porter v. Gottschall,187 the requesting party suc-
cessfully sought photographs of an accident scene. No witness could recall the
accident itself, the passage of six years had faded the memory of the only
witness who could recall the scene of the accident, and the only other evidence,
a rough diagram drawn by an investigating officer, did not adequately substi-
tute as evidence. Basically, in Porter, it was simply impossible to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the requested photographs, regardless of the hard-
ships the requesting party might have been willing to sustain. Clearly, a re-
questing party will have to demonstrate a good faith effort to obtain the sub-
stantial equivalent. 88 Dilatory preparation efforts should be fatal to a work
product request.189
Perhaps the most useful way to examine the need and hardship test is to
focus on key factors that should influence the courts. These include the
following:
(1) Date of requested item. An item created at or shortly after the time
of the liability-creating event more likely will be held discoverable because it is
more likely to be unique and to constitute material evidence.' 90
(2) Availability of alternate sources. The extent to which the requesting
184. Id. at 66.
185. See generally J. MOORE, 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.64 [3-1], at
26-375 to 26-377. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the court noted work
product might be discoverable if it "might be useful for purposes of impeachment or
corroboration." Id. at 511. But see Helverson v. J.J. Newberry Co., 16 F.R.D. 330(W.D. Mo. 1954) (denying discovery sought on impeachment grounds); cf. State v.
Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74, 82 (Mo. 1968) (prosecuting witness' statement not required to
be produced at trial of criminal case where defendant alleged only a possibility of im-
peachment). Pre-Rule 56.01(b)(3) case law indicated that work product was immune
even where sought for impeachment purposes. See State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
186. See J. MOORE. 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.64[3.-1] at 26-362 to
26-381, and cases cited therein; cf. State ex rel. Albert v. Adams, 540 S.W.2d 26, 30
(Mo. 1976) (en banc) ("It is a plain rule of discovery that a party will not be required
to make available any compilation of data or research efforts that is equally available
to the interrogating party."); Combellick v. Rooks, 401 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Mo. 1966)(en bane) (noting that opposing party might not be required to produce the statement
where requesting party had equal access to the statement).
187. 615 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1981) (en bane).
188. State ex rel. Albert v. Adams, 540 S.W.2d 26, 30 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
189. Cf. id.
190. See, e.g., Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Mo. 1981) (en bane)
(photographs taken shortly after accident); State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 540 S.W.2d
50, 60-61 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (Seiler, C.J., dissenting) (contemporaneous witness
statements should be more freely discoverable than non-contemporaneous statements).
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party has reasonable access to witnesses, non-protected documents, or other
sources that could satisfactorily substitute for the requested item clearly will
influence the courts.19 '
(3) Requesting party's preparation efforts. Dilatory preparation efforts
will substantially lessen a requesting party's chances of obtaining work prod-
uct. If the requesting party had substantially the same opportunity to secure
evidence as the other party, a court very likely will deny discovery.192
(4) Uniqueness. Certain items uniquely preserve evidence. Photographs,
tape recordings, and documentation of testing that destroys unique objects,
such as cutting up sections from failed structural supports, are logical exam-
ples of this category. Courts are more likely to order discovery of these items,
than of items for which satisfactory substitutes are available. 9 '
(5) Passage of time. Passage of time will impair certain types of evidence,
such as Witnesses' memories. 9 4 If the requesting party did not have reasonable
access to witnesses at the time of their statements to the opposing party, the
statements more likely will be discoverable.' 95
There is little Missouri case law regarding the required showing under
Rule 56.01(b)(3). Therefore, federal precedents may be useful. 96
C. Waiver
In State ex rel. Mueller v. Dixon, 97 a pre-Rule 56.01(b)(3) case, the
court held that "[w]ork product immunity, as any other, may be relinquished
by voluntary disclosure of the protected information."' 98 In Dixon, the oppos-
191. In Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1981) (en banc), the party
seeking photographs did not have such access. See also Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef
Carrier, 87 F.R.D. 89, 93 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (police report satisfactory substitute for
work product witness statement); cf. State ex rel. Albert v. Adams, 540 S.W.2d 26, 30
(Mo. 1976) (en banc).
192. See, e.g., Almaguer v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147, 150
(D.C. Neb. 1972) (discovery of document denied because of failure to timely seek
deposition).
193. See, e.g., Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Mo. 1981) (en banc)
(witness' memory was not satisfactory substitute for requested photographs); cf. State
ex rel. Premier Panels v. Swink, 400 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. App., St. L. 1966) (tests of
allegedly defective product were not work product because they were not prepared at
request of counsel).
194. See, e.g., Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
195. See, J. MOORE, 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.64[3.-1], at 26-369 n.8
and cases cited therein.
196. Missouri courts are not bound by federal work product case law. See State
ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v. McMillian, 351 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Mo. 1961) (en
banc). However, Missouri courts have followed federal case law in some cases. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Pete Rhodes Supply Co. v. Crain, 373 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Mo. 1963) (en
banc).
197. 456 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App., K.C. 1970).
198. Id. at 597. See generally Note, Waiver of the Work Product Immunity, 4
U. ILL. L.F. 953, 964 (1981).
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ing party already had revealed the basic contents of the requested work prod-
uct. This disclosure, directly to the requesting party, clearly satisfied the prin-
ciple that waiver occurs upon a disclosure that is inconsistent with denying
access to the requesting party. 99
Waiver should not be found where work product is disclosed to persons
with allied interests. 00 For example, disclosure to expert consultants should
not automatically constitute waiver.2"1 However, if such experts are later iden-
tified as experts to be used at trial, and they rely upon work product for testi-
monial purposes, the other party probably will be able to obtain the
material. 20 2
The waiver of work product protection with respect to a particular item
probably does not waive other privileges that may shield such item from dis-
covery.203 And waiver of other privileges with respect to a particular item
should not necessitate a finding that work product protection has been
waived.204 In Halford v. Yandell,2°5 the plaintiff waived the attorney-client
privilege with respect to a requested written statement. This waiver, however,
did not automatically waive work product protection. 206 In this regard, the
court stated that "[a]n objection based upon the ground of violation of work
product is not equivalent to an objection based on the ground of violation of
the attorney-client privilege." 201 The Yandell court proceeded to consider on
its merits a claim that the statement was work product.
It has been stated that either the attorney or the client may assert the
work product protection. 20 8 The ultimate decision with respect to waiver, how-
ever, should be that of the client. It also should be clear that an attorney
cannot assert work product protection against his client's wishes with respect
to materials prepared for the client's case. 20 9
199. See Note, supra note 9, at 881-84.
200. See 23 AM. JUR. 2d Depositions and Discovery § 67 (1983).
201. Arguably, work product disclosed to an expert should not thereby become
discoverable. See Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 97 (W.D. Mo. 1983). Mo. R.
Civ. P. 56.01 (b)(4) provides the exclusive means for discovery of facts known and opin-
ions held by experts which were acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation.
Subdivision (b)(4)(a) provides for identification by interrogatory of any expert whom
the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and for a statement of the
general nature of the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify. Rule
56.01 (b)(4) purports to provide the exclusive method for discovery of experts' opinions
and knowledge of facts. However, documents upon which experts base trial testimony
may be discoverable at that time. Cf. Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400, 406-10
(Mo. App., Spr. 1977).
202. See 23 AM. JUR. 2d Depositions and Discovery § 67 (1983).
203. See Halford v. Yandell, 558 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977).
204. See id.
205. 558 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977).
206. Id. at 404.
207. Id.
208. See Note, supra note 9, at 869-80.
209. See Note, supra note 9, at 874.
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D. Discovery in Other Litigation
The extent to which work product in one lawsuit is protected in subse-
quent or concurrent litigation has been discussed in a number of jurisdictions,
including Missouri.21 0 Complex multi-suit relationships can be imagined, but
the problem most likely would arise when one party's work product is re-
quested in another concurrent lawsuit (in which the first person is not a party)
by a person who is a party in both lawsuits. If the first party's work product is
not protected in the second lawsuit, the requesting party will be able to obtain
freely his opponent's trial preparations. Undoubtedly there are other scenarios;
however, the foregoing example demonstrates the problems that can result
from discovery of work product in other litigation.
The most desirable result would be to protect work product from discov-
ery or subpoena in any other lawsuit once the protection has successfully been
asserted (absent waiver or other factor rendering the work product discovera-
ble). Lawyers and parties thereby would be assured of the "zone of privacy"
that the United States Supreme Court created in Hickman v. Taylor.211 Rule
56.01(b)(3), however, purports only to cover work product of a party or a
party's representative.2 2 The Missouri Supreme Court discussed the possibil-
ity of protecting the work product of nonparties in State ex rel. Missouri Pub-
lic Service Company v. Elliott.13 Missouri should extend by rule or case law
work product protection to include nonparties' work product. Federal cases
have extended different levels of protection to work product created in other
litigation. This protection ranges from shielding documents in related litigation
to providing the same level of immunity for all work product regardless of the
lawsuit for which it is prepared.21 4 Unfortunately, the only Missouri case di-
rectly addressing the other litigation issue failed to extend any protection to
work product outside of the litigation for which it is created. In State ex rel.
J.E. Dunn Construction Company v. Sprinkle,2 1 5 the city of Kansas City sued
J.E. Dunn Construction Company for damages arising out of the Kemper
Arena roof collapse. Prior to that lawsuit, the city's casualty insurer, Great
American Insurance Company, had investigated the city's claim for casualty
coverage. The investigation generated documents relating to the city's cover-
age claim and the cause of the collapse.216 The city and Great American In-
surance Company ultimately settled under an agreement resulting in the law-
suit against Dunn. Dunn requested production of the documents from the
earlier investigation in the city's control. The city objected, partly on work
210. See State ex reL J.E. Dunn Constr. Co. v. Sprinkle, 650 S.W.2d 707, 711
(Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
211. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
212. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3) (emphasis added).
213. 434 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
214. See Note, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 412 (1983); Note, supra note 9, at 855-64.
215. 650 S.W.2d 707 (Mo. App., W.D. 1983).
216. Id. at 709.
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product grounds. 217
There was no question that the requested material would be work product
in litigation between the city and the insurance company.218 However, the
court of appeals rejected the argument that such immunity would apply in the
current litigation, holding, "[tihe qualified 'work product' immunity applies
only to information and materials gathered by one's adversary in the litigation,
or in preparation for the litigation, in which the discovery is being sought.2 1
The holding in J.E. Dunn Construction Company should be re-examined.
By restricting protection of work product to the litigation for which it is pre-
pared, the decision creates a number of problems. First, parties and courts will
have to determine for which litigation an item of work product is prepared.
Second, allowing such discovery will dilute the privacy accorded trial prepara-
tions and, under the reasoning of Hickman v. Taylor,220 will aggravate
problems that the work product doctrine was designed to solve. Attorneys will
be less inclined to fully document trial preparation out of fear that such docu-
mentation will not be protected. Third, parties might be compelled to reveal
work product during the pendency of the litigation for which it is prepared. If
the work product is requested in concurrent litigation, under J.E. Dunn Con-
struction Company, parties may have to produce the material, with the at-
tendant risk that their opponents will obtain the material. Thus, opinion work
product would be accorded no greater protection than regular work product. 21
VI. STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING DISCOVERY OF TRIAL PREPARATIONS
From a practical standpoint, faced with the possibility that work product
materials may be discovered, attorneys and parties can take various actions to
minimize the risk of such discovery.
Document creation should be strictly controlled. When the possibility of
litigation arises, documents created with respect to that possibility should be
maintained separately from documents created in the party's day-to-day non-
litigation activities. 222 Such documents should be identified as work product.
Naturally, this labeling will not ensure protection; however, it will support the
party's argument that the document was created in anticipation of litiga-
tion. 223 Documents created in anticipation of litigation should, if possible, in-
clude theories and opinions of representatives responsible for the litigation.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 711.
219. Id.
220. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
221. This is another reason for utilizing attorney-client communications in trial
preparations. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
222. This will weaken any argument that the documents were created in the or-
dinary course of business.
223. Labeling has been a factor in defeating a claim of work product. See State
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This will increase the likelihood that a particular document will be absolutely
protected as opinion work product.
Attorneys and parties also should maximize the use of attorney-client
communications in the preparation of lawsuits. The documents thereby created
will be absolutely privileged and immune from discovery,224 although relevant
facts recited in such documents will remain freely discoverable.2 25 Neverthe-
less, from the standpoint of the party to whom discovery has been propounded,
it is much more desirable to respond to interrogatories by framing answers
specifically for that purpose, rather than having to provide one's opponent with
documents that were created for internal use.
VII. CONCLUSION
Work product has evolved and changed dramatically in Missouri since
Hickman v Taylor.226 There have been two opposing strains of thought and
policy running through this development. First, there has been a general ten-
dency toward liberalization of discovery, which has included a trend towards
allowing discovery of certain work product materials.227 Always present, how-
ever, has been an undercurrent of limiting intrusion into lawyers' and parties'
preparations for trial. 228 This, of course, is the classic conflict that first led to
creation of the work product doctrine and then to the limited discoverability
test of Rule 56.01(b)(3). These two counter-trends will continue to shape the
work product doctrine in Missouri.
224. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text. Of course, the privilege
would not attach to documents attached to such communications. See supra notes 84-
90 and accompanying text.
226. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
227. See supra notes 36-40, 92 and accompanying text.
228. The most apparent example being the new insurer-insured privilege. See
supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
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